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OPINION OF THE COURT
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
G-I Holdings, Inc. (“G-I”)  purchased from Reliance1
Insurance Company a policy covering claims made against G-I’s
directors and officers between July 1999 and July 2002.  Shortly
after the policy was issued, Reliance encountered financial
difficulties.  In the summer of 2000, Hartford Fire Insurance
Company  took over claims administration for Reliance.2
Hartford also assumed some of Reliance’s liabilities and
reinsured other of those liabilities going forward.  To protect
itself against Reliance’s impending insolvency, G-I split its
initial Reliance policy with Hartford, keeping coverage for
claims made up to July 15, 2000 with Reliance and shifting
4coverage for the remaining period (July 15, 2000 to July 1,
2002) to a new Hartford policy.  Reliance went into liquidation
and G-I sought coverage for three fraudulent conveyance suits
against Samuel J. Heyman, its CEO, chairman of its Board of
Directors and controlling shareholder.  The first of those suits
was brought during the amended Reliance coverage period,
while the other two were brought during the Hartford coverage
period.  Under the policies’ terms, because all three suits relate
to the same allegedly fraudulent conveyance, their filing dates
relate back to the date of the first suit (and thus fall within the
Reliance coverage period).
G-I filed a claim for coverage in Reliance’s liquidation.
But it also sued Hartford, arguing both that Hartford was liable
under the policy it had issued to G-I (despite the fact that the
first suit, to which the other two relate back, was filed during the
Reliance policy period), and that Hartford was liable to G-I
under the Reliance policy because agreements Hartford entered
into with Reliance made Hartford responsible for Reliance’s
coverage obligations.  In addition, G-I contended that Hartford
was barred by judicial estoppel from arguing that the suits filed
during its policy period related back to the suit filed during the
Reliance policy period because, in an earlier stage of the
litigation, Hartford had taken a position at odds with that
argument.  In granting Hartford’s motion for summary
judgment, the District Court rejected all of these contentions.
We do so as well, and thus affirm.
      The United States District Court for the Southern District3
of New York and the Supreme Court of the State of New York,
5
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In February 2000, G-I bought an insurance policy from
Reliance that covered liability arising out of claims made by
third parties against G-I’s directors and officers (including
Heyman) between July 1, 1999 and July 1, 2002.  The policy
included an “interrelated wrongful acts” provision, stating that
the filing date of all suits arising from the same wrongful act
would be the date on which the first such suit was filed.  The
coverage limit was $15 million.  G-I appears to have paid a
premium of $185,000. 
In 1997, facing more than $200 million in existing
asbestos liability and the prospect of hundreds of thousands of
future claims, G-I distributed to Heyman the stock of a
profitable subsidiary.  As expected, asbestos claimants or their
representatives filed fraudulent conveyance actions against
Heyman and G-I: these were filed on (1) January 3, 2000 by an
injured employee seeking class certification (the “Nettles
action”); (2) September 19, 2000 by the Center for Claims
Resolution, a non-profit entity created by asbestos defendants to
pay claims (the “CCR action”); and (3) September 17, 2001 by
the Official Committee of Asbestos Claimants in G-I’s Chapter
11 bankruptcy case filed in 2001 (the “Claimants Committee
action”).   3
venues for the Nettles and CCR actions respectively, placed
those actions on hold in 2001 pending resolution of material
parts of G-I’s bankruptcy case.
       Marsh & McLennan Companies is a professional services4
firm.  Marsh is its insurance brokerage business.  See Overview:
T h e  B u s i n e s s e s  o f  M M C ,
http://www.mmc.com/about/index.php (last visited Oct. 21,
2009). 
       This new policy was issued by a Hartford subsidiary, Twin5
City Fire Insurance Company.  For convenience, we refer simply
to Hartford as the issuer.
6
In early 2000, Reliance was in financial trouble.  In
summer and fall 2000, pursuant to an Asset Purchase
Agreement, a Quota Share Reinsurance Agreement and two
Claims Servicing Agreements, Hartford acquired renewal and
other rights to, and became a reinsurer and servicer of, certain
Reliance policies.  In July 2000, after Reliance’s rating fell
below the minimum financial guidelines for insurers set by G-I’s
insurance broker, Marsh,  G-I’s risk manager (Robert Flugger)4
asked Marsh to arrange for G-I to acquire a directors and
officers insurance policy from Hartford.  Reliance changed the
coverage termination date of its policy to July 15, 2000 from
July 1, 2002, and Hartford issued G-I an identical policy with a
period of July 15, 2000 to July 1, 2002.   An endorsement to the5
Hartford policy limited the sum of coverage under it and the
amended Reliance policy to $15 million.  As part of the
      For the remainder of this opinion, we refer to G-I and6
Heyman collectively as “G-I.”
       The procedural history is complex.  After Reliance denied7
coverage of the Nettles and CCR claims, G-I sued Reliance and
its excess insurer, Great American Insurance Company, in
November 2000 in New Jersey state court.  G-I did not add
7
transaction, Reliance refunded, and Hartford received,
$153,935.18 in premiums.  
In sum, there were now two policies: the amended
Reliance policy, which covered claims made between July 1,
1999 and July 15, 2000; and the Hartford policy, which covered
claims made between July 15, 2000 and July 1, 2002.  The
Nettles action filing date falls within the amended Reliance
policy period and the CCR and Claimants Committee filing
dates fall within the Hartford policy period.  But because of the
interrelated wrongful acts provisions in both the amended
Reliance and Hartford policies, the filing date of the CCR and
Claimants Committee actions relate back to the filing date of the
Nettles action, placing them outside the Hartford policy period
and within the amended Reliance policy period.
G-I and Heyman  sought coverage for the three6
fraudulent conveyance actions.  A Pennsylvania state court
ordered the liquidation of Reliance in October 2001, and G-I has
agreed to pursue coverage from Reliance in that proceeding.   In7
Hartford as a defendant until August 2001 because, according
to G-I, it was unaware of the agreements between Reliance and
Hartford, had not seen the Hartford policy, and did not know
that the amended Reliance policy moved up the coverage period
end date from July 2002 to July 2000.  Reliance removed the
action to the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey.  That action was subsequently dismissed and refiled by
G-I in the Bankruptcy Court supervising its bankruptcy.  In May
2002, the Bankruptcy Court referred this non-core proceeding
back to the District Court.  It stayed G-I’s claims against
Reliance.  In 2004, the District Court dismissed claims against
the excess insurer (Great American) without prejudice because
G-I had not exhausted its rights against Reliance. 
       In August 2004, G-I added as defendants the New Jersey8
Property-Liability Insurance Guarantee Association and the New
York Property/Casualty Insurance Security Fund.  The District
Court dismissed the claims against the former without prejudice
in December 2006 because recovery against it depended on
resolution of coverage issues pending against Reliance in
Pennsylvania.  In December 2008, the parties stipulated to
dismissal without prejudice of G-I’s claims and this appeal as
against the latter.  Claims against these insurers are therefore not
8
this case, G-I seeks coverage from Hartford.  The District Court
in 2004 denied motions by G-I for summary judgment and by
Hartford for dismissal.  In June 2006, G-I again moved for
summary judgment and Hartford did so as well.  The District
Court then granted Hartford’s motion and denied that of G-I,
which now appeals.   8
before us on appeal.
9
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291.  We exercise plenary review of an order granting
summary judgment.  Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 223 (3d
Cir. 2008).  Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.  “[T]o survive summary
judgment . . . [,] a non[-]movant must present sufficient
evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find in [its] favor.”
Sovereign Bank v. BJ's Wholesale Club, 533 F.3d 162, 172 (3d
Cir. 2008) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).  We
make our view of the evidence and inferences therefrom as
favorable as possible to the non-movant.  U.S. ex rel. Kosenske
v. Carlisle HMA, 554 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2009).  The District
Court applied New Jersey law; the parties do not appeal that
choice and we follow it.  We may affirm on any ground
supported by the record.  Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303
(3d Cir. 2006).
III.  ANALYSIS
G-I argues that Hartford must cover some or all of the
fraudulent conveyance actions because:  (1) Reliance and
Hartford agreed to provide insurance coverage for a single
       G-I’s argument that Reliance amended its policy without9
G-I’s consent or otherwise failed to abide by the cancellation
provisions of the policy is, strictly construed, of no help to G-I,
10
policy period, and thus the Hartford policy period includes the
amended Reliance policy period; (2) the interrelated wrongful
acts provisions in the policies should not apply, and therefore
at least the two later-filed fraudulent conveyance actions fall
within the policy period Hartford claims it covered; and/or (3)
the purchase, servicing, and reinsurance agreements between
Hartford and Reliance, and the close relationship of those parties
in any event, make Hartford directly liable under the amended
Reliance policy.  It further contends that we should use the
doctrine of judicial estoppel to bar Hartford from relying on the
interrelated wrongful acts provisions to avoid coverage because
Hartford asserted a contradictory argument in its motion to
dismiss in the District Court.
A. The Hartford Policy Period Does Not Include
the Amended Reliance Policy Period.
It appears that G-I agues that the Hartford policy period
includes the entire initial Reliance policy period because (1) G-I
requested a policy from Hartford that would cover the Reliance
policy period and (2) Hartford behaved as if this were the case.
We arrive at these arguments by construing in the most
favorable way G-I’s contentions that Reliance amended its
policy period without G-I’s consent  and that Hartford9
as it suggests that the initial Reliance policy remains in force
and Reliance, rather than Hartford, is therefore liable.  We
construe this argument as the claim that Hartford mistakenly
provided G-I with a policy that failed to conform to a request by
G-I for a policy that would cover the entire period of July 1,
1999 to July 1, 2002 (rather than the July 15, 2000 to July 1,
2002 period in the policy Hartford in fact issued).
      This “reasonable expectations” approach to interpreting10
insurance contracts applies even where, as here, the insured is a
sophisticated actor.  See Doto, 659 A.2d at 1376–77 (company’s
commercial-umbrella liability policy); Sparks v. St. Paul
11
effectively assumed Reliance’s obligations.
We note at the outset that, in arguing that the Hartford
policy period includes the initial Reliance period, G-I is asking
us to disregard the plain language of the Hartford policy, which,
by its terms, covers only the period between July 15, 2000 and
July 1, 2002.  That, however, is not necessarily fatal to G-I’s
prospects, at least not in this context.  Under New Jersey law, an
insurance policy that has been unilaterally drafted by the insurer
(such as this one) will typically be treated as a contract of
adhesion.  See Doto v. Russo, 659 A.2d 1371, 1376 (N.J. 1995).
As such, New Jersey courts “constru[e] contracts of insurance
to reflect the reasonable expectations of the insured in the face
of ambiguous language and phrasing, and[,] in exceptional
circumstances, [even] when the literal meaning of the policy is
plain.”   Id. at 1377.  Thus, it is open to G-I to argue that (1) it10
Insurance, 495 A.2d 406, 413 (N.J. 1985) (lawyer’s liability
insurance policy); Sealed Air v. Royal Indemnity, 961 A.2d
1195, 1203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (corporation’s
directors and officers policy).
12
was reasonable to expect that the Hartford policy period would
include the period initially covered by the Reliance policy, and
(2) this is one of those situations in which its reasonable
expectations should trump the plain meaning of the policy.  See
Pizzullo v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins., 952 A.2d 1077, 1089 (N.J.
2008) (“[I]n some circumstances, we have recognized that it
might be appropriate to permit an insured’s reasonable
expectations to overcome the plain meaning of a policy.”).
In performing the reasonable-expectations analysis, we
first ask whether, without making a request or receiving some
affirmative signal, an insured can reasonably expect that the
policy period of a new policy it takes out in response to the
financial difficulties of a prior insurer will include the period of
the old policy.  If such an inclusion would follow as a matter of
course, that would strengthen G-I’s position considerably.
However, G-I has provided no evidence to show that the process
of acquiring a new policy from one insurer in response to the
financial difficulties of a prior insurer is so standardized or
driven by such determinate purposes that an insured (here G-I)
can reasonably expect a specific relationship between the policy
periods of the prior and new policies.  As a result, to put at issue
whether it was reasonable for G-I to have expected the Hartford
       As noted, G-I employed an insurance broker, Marsh.11
Because G-I does not challenge the actions of its broker, we
forgo analysis of agency relationships between or among Marsh,
Hartford, and/or G-I.  See Aden v. Fortsh, 776 A.2d 792, 800–01
(N.J. 2000).
13
policy to cover the entire Reliance policy period, G-I had to
establish either that (1) it requested a policy covering the entire
period and Hartford did not clearly refuse to provide it or, more
generally, that (2) Hartford by its actions or representations
otherwise created a reasonable expectation in G-I that Hartford
would provide such a policy.   11
G-I has provided no evidence a reasonable jury could use
to find that G-I actually requested a policy from Hartford
covering the amended Reliance policy period of July 1, 1999 to
July 15, 2000.  The record contains only the statements of
Flugger:
Q. . . . So you understood that you were going to
have a Hartford policy from a certain date, it
would be effective from a certain date agreed
upon, and your Reliance policy would be canceled
as of that date; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. . . . You understood that they were two
14
separate policies[?]
. . .
A.  They would have been two separate policies.
. . .
Q. . . . Did you have an understanding that the
effective date would be some time in or about
July of 2000 for [t]he Hartford policy?  
A. Yes.
Q. . . . [D]id you have an understanding that your
Reliance policy would be in effect up until the
date of the cancellation and rewrite?  
A. Either that or they were just going to continue
with the Reliance policy.  Basically Hartford
would handle the claims, and Hartford would
collect the premiums and whatever.  I believe
there was a bifurcation between the two . . . .  I
was going to get Hartford paper for my D and O
policy. 
 Based on this testimony, we cannot say that Flugger asked for
a policy covering claims made during the amended Reliance
       G-I points to other statements by Flugger describing his12
expectations regarding the “prior litigation date” under the
Hartford policy.  “Prior litigation date” is a technical phrase
referring to a date that precedes the start of the policy period.
Flugger’s statements are irrelevant because we are interested in
his expectations concerning the policy period, not the “prior
litigation date.”
15
policy period (July 1, 1999 to July 15, 2000).   12
As there is no evidence that G-I requested that Hartford
cover a period that included the amended Reliance period, we
turn to whether G-I, based on Hartford’s behavior, could
reasonably have expected Hartford to include in its coverage the
amended Reliance period.  G-I has provided no evidence to
support that proposition.  It nevertheless points to two factors
that it believes justify a reasonable expectation.  First, the
content and administration of the initial Reliance and Hartford
policies were the same.  Specifically: (a) in writing the policy,
Hartford did none of the typical underwriting acts of a successor
insurer (e.g., requiring G-I to complete a new application and
provide updated information); (b) the Hartford policy number
remained the same as the initial policy number except for an
“H”; and (c) claims administration pursuant to agreements
between Reliance and Hartford transferred “seamlessly” from
Reliance to Hartford.  Second, G-I contends that the handling of
premiums and the liability cap suggested that Hartford assumed
the old Reliance policy—specifically, (a) G-I never paid
       G-I also points to an affidavit by Flugger that states that a13
Marsh representative “conveyed Hartford’s offer to assume
responsibilities under G-I’s existing Reliance policy.”  Flugger
does not state whether this offer included assumption of liability
for claims made before July 15, 2000.  Without more detail
about what “responsibilities” Flugger meant, this lends no
support to G-I.
       The initial Reliance policy states the premium as14
$185,000, excluding a small state surcharge.  The binder for the
Hartford policy lists the premium as $153,935.18.  This suggests
that Reliance kept more than $30,000 of the initial premium
when it amended its policy to cover the shorter period of July 1,
1999 to July 15, 2000.  Hartford got the rest.  
We note that there is some question whether G-I actually
paid $185,000 for the initial Reliance policy.  The premium
listed for the Hartford policy is $121,422, before applying a
small state surcharge.  This amount differs from the Hartford
16
additional premiums, (b) those it paid to Reliance were
transferred directly to Hartford, and (c) an endorsement capped
combined liability of Hartford and Reliance under the policies
at $15 million.13
The handling of premiums and the combined liability cap
could not have created a reasonable expectation that Hartford
would cover the amended Reliance policy period.  There is
evidence that Flugger knew that Reliance split the original
policy premium with Hartford.   That should have suggested to14
policy premium of $153,935.18 listed on the insurance binder
issued by Hartford.  By analogy, a discrepancy might also exist
between the premium listed on the initial Reliance policy and
what G-I paid.
Regardless how much premium G-I actually paid, there
is evidence that Reliance split it with Hartford.  The record
contains statements by both Flugger and a Hartford employee to
that effect.  Flugger stated in an affidavit that a Marsh
representative told him that “unearned” premiums paid by G-I
to Reliance would be forwarded to Hartford.  The Hartford
employee stated that “Hartford agreed without reunderwriting to
write a new policy for the remainder of the term for the pro rata
premium that was cancelled out of the Reliance account.”
       We are mindful that Hartford took over 80% of the initial15
premium, and this exceeded the portion of the initial policy
period that Hartford assumed (roughly 67%).  If, as a matter of
industry practice, premium and policy period should be
proportional (a possibility not addressed in the record), then this
suggests that Hartford’s share of the original premium was out
of proportion to its period of coverage.
If Hartford’s share of the original premium were grossly
17
a reasonable corporate insured employing a risk manager that
Reliance and Hartford were splitting the risk insured by the
original policy.  Such a splitting of risk should in turn have
suggested to G-I that Reliance and Hartford were splitting the
initial three-year policy period.  G-I should have concluded that
Hartford was not agreeing to cover the entire initial Reliance
policy period.  15
excessive relative to the portion of the policy period that it
assumed, then it might be reasonable for G-I to expect Hartford
to cover more of the original policy period.  G-I has not made
this argument and we can find no evidence that Hartford
received a grossly excessive share of the initial premium in any
event.  We therefore do not believe that the mismatch between
premium division and policy period coverages justifies denying
summary judgment here.
18
The combined liability cap also should have suggested to
a reasonable insured that Reliance and Hartford split the risk
(and coverage period) of the initial policy.  That policy charged
a certain premium for coverage of $15 million.  Because G-I did
not add to the initial premium in obtaining the Hartford policy
(rather, it split the premium between Reliance and Hartford), it
makes sense that combined coverage under the amended
Reliance and Hartford policies would not vary greatly from the
$15 million commanded at the outset by the same premium
(assuming the risk profile of G-I had not changed markedly
since Reliance first wrote its coverage).  In fact, the parties kept
the combined limit at the first-set $15 million.
If Hartford had assumed all risk under the initial Reliance
policy, then a reasonable insured would have expected Hartford
to acquire the entire premium G-I had initially paid to Reliance
and to have assumed coverage up to the full $15 million limit.
That Hartford did not do these things should have put G-I on
        As we discussed above, G-I’s sophistication does not16
prevent us from construing the insurance policies it acquires in
light of its reasonable expectations.  It does, however, affect the
analysis of what would count as a reasonable expectation for it
to have had when obtaining a particular policy.
19
notice that, absent other affirmative signs, it could not
reasonably expect Hartford to cover the entire policy period. 
The identity in content and administration of the amended
Reliance and Hartford policies does not change our view.  We
may take G-I’s sophistication into account in deciding what was
objectively reasonable for it to expect from its insurers.  See
Werner Industries v. First State, 548 A.2d 188, 192 (N.J.
1988).   Any knowledge of G-I that Hartford had taken over16
claims administration for Reliance should not reasonably have
caused G-I to expect coverage from Hartford for the entire
policy period.  A reasonable insured with enough sophistication
to employ a risk manager would know the difference between
claims servicing and the assumption of liabilities.  Similarly, a
sophisticated insured would recognize that use of identical
policy language and a lack of additional underwriting do not
necessarily signal that a new insurer has assumed liabilities
under an old policy.  Such an insured would also recognize that
these attributes are consistent with a splitting of risk, policy
periods and premiums between an old and a new insurer.  We
thus discern no basis to conclude that G-I could have reasonably
expected its policy with Hartford to cover the Reliance policy
      It is therefore unnecessary for us to decide whether this is17
one of those instances in which an insured’s reasonable
expectations can trump the plain meaning of the policy
language, an issue with respect to which New Jersey law
provides little guidance.
20
period.17
B. The Interrelated Wrongful Acts Provision
Applies.
As an alternative, G-I claims that even if the Hartford
policy does not cover the entire initial Reliance policy, it covers
the CCR and Claimants Committee actions because plaintiffs in
those actions filed them within the Hartford policy period of
July 15, 2000 to July 1, 2002.  In response, Hartford points to
the interrelated wrongful acts provision in the policy, which (as
noted already) deems the filing date for all claims arising out of
the same wrongful act as the filing date of the first such claim.
Because plaintiffs in the Nettles action (the first of the three
fraudulent conveyance actions) filed on January 3, 2000, before
the July 15, 2000 start of the Hartford policy period, the
interrelated wrongful acts provision, Hartford contends, bars
coverage for all three actions.
G-I appears to concede this in the abstract, but counters
that the interrelated wrongful acts provision should not apply to
this case because the purposes for which insurers include that
      As noted above, New Jersey courts, in interpreting18
insurance contracts, strive to give effect to the reasonable
expectations of the insured, even in some instances where doing
so would run contrary to the contract’s plain meaning.  See
Pizzullo, 952 at 1089.  We need not decide whether this is one
of those instances, since an examination of the purposes for
which insurers include interrelated wrongful acts provisions in
21
provision in contracts do not apply here.  Citing insurance
treatises, G-I states that those purposes are (1) to ensure that
risks arising out of the same wrongful act are subject to one
policy and therefore one liability limit, and (2) to prevent
changes in policy language from one policy period to another
from creating disparate coverage determinations for the same
wrongful act.  According to G-I, these purposes do not apply
here because the $15 million combined cap on the Hartford
policy and amended Reliance policy already ensures that G-I
cannot recover more than $15 million on all claims combined
for both policies.  Because the language of the amended
Reliance and Hartford policies is identical, G-I continues, there
is no danger of disparate coverage determinations, and thus we
should treat the policy’s interrelated wrongful acts provision as
not triggered under the facts of this case.
We are not convinced.  Even were we inclined to make
application of the policy’s interrelated wrongful acts provision
contingent on the purposes behind that provision—as opposed
to applying the contract as written —we would still apply the18
contracts fail to reveal anything that would have justified G-I in
thinking that the provision would not apply under the facts
before us. 
22
provision.  That is because the interrelated wrongful acts
provision does have a purpose that applies to this case.  Such a
provision not only allows insurers to cabin related wrongful acts
to a single policy period (thus subject to one limit), it also, as
one of the treatises that G-I itself cites points out, allows an
insured (such as G-I) to obtain coverage under a new policy,
despite facing additional liability exposure from its past acts, by
“reserving the argument that any future claims arising out of the
interconnected wrongful acts of a previously submitted claim
will be covered by the former policy.”  John F. Olson, et al.,
Director and Officer Liability: Indemnification and Insurance §
12:10 (2008).  We thus have ample reason to give effect to the
interrelated wrongful acts provision by barring coverage for the
CCR and Claimants Committee actions under the Hartford
policy.
C. Other Agreements Do Not Make Hartford
Directly Liable For The Fraudulent
Conveyance Actions.
G-I also argues that, even if the Hartford policy does not
cover the three fraudulent conveyance actions, Hartford still
must cover them because agreements between Hartford and
Reliance make Hartford directly liable under the amended
23
Reliance policy.  Specifically, Hartford contends that (1) the
agreements themselves create direct liability, or (2) the
reinsurance relationship created by them brings this case within
the ambit of Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker, 638 A.2d
1333, 1337–38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), which held a
reinsurer directly liable to an insured because of the reinsurer’s
close relationship with the insurer.
1.  Hartford’s agreements with Reliance
After Reliance encountered financial difficulties,
Hartford entered into a series of agreements with Reliance
concerning various coverage obligations of Reliance.  Contrary
to what G-I argues, however, none of those agreements creates
direct liability of Hartford for the amended Reliance policy.
The Asset Purchase Agreement between Reliance and
Hartford transferred books, records, and renewal rights (among
other things) relating to the amended Reliance policy to
Hartford.  It also transferred liabilities associated with the policy
“to the extent that any such liability is applicable to and accrues
with respect to periods subsequent to the Closing [likely June
30, 2000, the date the parties executed the Asset Purchase
Agreement].”  We therefore read the Asset Purchase Agreement
to transfer liability to Hartford on the amended Reliance policy
      We realize that the amended Reliance policy covered until19
July 15, 2001.  The difference in dates does not affect our
analysis.  The same is true for the Quota Share Reinsurance
Agreement and Claims Servicing Agreements discussed
immediately below.
       The initial Reliance policy permits modification only by20
endorsement signed by Reliance.  The change in policy period
at issue in this case probably required such an endorsement.  But
there is none in the record.  However, whether the amendment
thus is ineffective is irrelevant to this case because we are
concerned with claims made (or relating back to) before July
2000, and it is undisputed that pre-July 2000 claims fall within
both the initial and amended Reliance policy periods.
24
only for claims made sometime after June 30, 2000.   Because19
the plaintiffs in the Nettles action filed in January 2000, and the
subsequent actions relate back to that date, the Asset Purchase
Agreement did not transfer liability for them to Hartford.  20
The Quota Share Reinsurance Agreement makes Hartford
liable for a portion of amounts actually paid by Reliance under
the amended Reliance policy “relating to claims . . . made on or
after” July 1, 2000.  As a threshold matter, the Reinsurance
Agreement does not create direct liability to the insured for
Hartford, but only liability of it to Reliance for amounts
Reliance pays out under the amended Reliance policy.  But even
if it did, it would not cover the three fraudulent conveyance
actions because the Reinsurance Agreement applies only to
25
claims made on or after July 1, 2000.
Hartford entered into two Claims Servicing Agreements,
one covering claims made on the amended Reliance policy on or
before June 30, 2000, and the other covering claims made after
that date.  Hartford agreed to adjust, defend, and in some cases
settle (on Reliance’s behalf) claims under Reliance policies.
Both agreements contain a provision stating that Hartford “is in
no event financially responsible for payment or satisfaction of
‘claims,’ lawsuits, or any form of cause of action against any
‘named insured’ under the ‘policy(ies).’” Thus, here too there is
no basis for imposing direct liability on Hartford.
2.  Hartford’s relationship with Reliance
G-I argues additionally that, even if none of the specific
agreements between Hartford and Reliance makes Hartford
liable under the amended Reliance policy, the close relationship
created by those agreements had the effect of making Hartford
generally responsible for Reliance’s coverage obligations.  We
disagree.
As noted above, this particular argument of G-I’s is
drawn from Venetsanos.  In that case, the insurer, Homestead,
“fronted” in New Jersey despite its lack of an insurance license
by reinsuring a licensed insurer, Mutual, that it controlled.
Venetsanos, 638 A.2d at 1335, 1337.  Homestead (1) had “the
entire exposure for [policy] liability,” id. at 1335, (2) had final
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decision-making authority over whether to pay, id. at 1336, (3)
conducted the insurance investigation, id., (4) was responsible
for negotiation and settlement, id. at 1337, and (5) acted as the
agent for service of process on Mutual, id.  Although
Venetsanos recognized the general rule “that an original insured
does not enjoy a right of direct action against a true reinsurer,”
id. at 1339, it held that Homestead was directly liable on the
policy, id. at 1340, noting that “[w]here . . . the reinsuring
agreement itself provides . . . that it takes charge of and manages
the defense of suits against the original insured, the reinsurer
may be held to be a ‘privy’” to the insured’s action against the
insurer.  Id. at 1339.
The Court in Venetsanos was concerned with protecting
the ability of a New Jersey-insured to seek redress against a
foreign “fronter” in New Jersey courts.  Id. at 1338–39.  The
insurer, Mutual, had entered rehabilitation proceedings in
Pennsylvania and the Court was concerned that the plaintiff
would find it difficult to litigate its bad faith and coverage
claims in a foreign jurisdiction, particularly where, as in that
case, the reinsurance agreement had not been located.  Id.
Our case differs much from Venetsanos because (1)
Hartford did not have the same level of control over Reliance
that Homestead had over Mutual and (2) there is no allegation
of fronting.  The Asset Purchase Agreement does not confer
control over defense and settlement of claims under the
amended Reliance policy and, as we remarked above, does not
       We consider misleading G-I counsel’s conclusory21
statement in its opening brief that, under the Reinsurance
Agreement, “Hartford will reimburse one hundred percent
(100%) of any payments by Reliance.”  The relevant provisions
of the Agreement are more nuanced.  They read:
The Ceding Company [Reliance] cedes and the
Reinsurer [Hartford] hereby accepts one hundred
percent (100%) of the Ceding Company’s Net
Liability . . . for Ultimate Net Loss relating to
claims . . . made on or after the Effective Time
[July 1, 2000].
“Ultimate Net Loss” means that amount [of
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transfer liability for the fraudulent conveyance actions to
Hartford.  The Quota Share Reinsurance Agreement irrevocably
makes Hartford Reliance’s “lawful attorney-in-fact . . . , with
full power of substitution[,]” in defending, settling and
otherwise administering claims under the amended Reliance
policy, but only “with respect to claims made on or after” July
1, 2000.  The Reinsurance Agreement thus did not cede
Reliance’s control over the earlier-filed Nettles action or the
other two fraudulent conveyance actions, the filing dates of
which relate back to that of the first action.  As we already
noted, the Reinsurance Agreement also did not reinsure Reliance
for the fraudulent conveyance claims.  (Even if it did, it did not
do so fully, as that Agreement commits only a share of losses to
Hartford. )  The Claims Servicing Agreements specifically21
losses] that the Ceding Company has paid . . . .
“Net Liability” means . . . that portion of any
Ultimate Net Loss that the Ceding Company has
retained net for its own account after the
application of all reinsurance . . . , which shall be
a percentage of the Ceding Company’s gross
liability for losses, which percentage shall be the
applicable quota share percentages indicated in
Attachment A . . . and shall not exceed the limits
set forth therein.  Reinsurer’s liability hereunder
with respect to any loss or losses shall not be
increased by reason of the inability of the Ceding
Company to collect from any other reinsurers,
whether specific or general, any amounts which
may be due from them, whether such inability
arises from the insolvency of such other reinsurers
or otherwise . . . . 
These provisions tie Hartford’s liability to percentages (most
less than 100) contained in Attachment A to the Reinsurance
Agreement.
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preserved the authority of Reliance to direct Hartford in the
handling of any claim.  In this context, Venetsanos is simply off
track from our case.
We note in addition that we are particularly reluctant to
permit direct recovery by the insured against the reinsurer in this
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case because of Reliance’s Pennsylvania liquidation proceeding.
Doing so could expose Hartford to double liability because
Pennsylvania law does not reduce a reinsurer’s liability to the
insurer’s estate as a result of direct payments to the insured.  40
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 221.34.  Direct recovery would also prevent the
Pennsylvania liquidator from equitably apportioning the
recovery among all insureds.  See 40 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 221.1(c)(iv).  We believe G-I should stand in line in
Pennsylvania with other insureds.  See generally James E.
Rudnik, Reinsurance as a Source of Recovery for Insured
Losses, 15-Jan. Constr. Lawyer 31, 33–34 (1995). 
D. Judicial Estoppel Does Not Apply to
Hartford’s Invoking Of The Interrelated
Wrongful Acts Provision.
In its first complaint, G-I argued that Hartford was liable
on the amended Reliance policy solely because of its reinsurance
and other agreements with Reliance.  It did not yet argue, as it
does here, that Hartford was liable for the CCR and Claimants
Committee actions under the Hartford policy.  In motioning to
dismiss the complaint in November 2002, Hartford claimed that
it was not bad faith to deny coverage of the CCR and Claimants
Committee actions because, regardless whether Hartford’s
agreements with Reliance created direct liability for the
amended Reliance policy, both actions were filed after the end
of the amended Reliance policy period.  In making this
argument, Hartford ignored the interrelated wrongful acts
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provision in the amended Reliance policy.  As we have seen,
that provision relates the filing dates for the CCR and Claimants
Committee actions back to the Nettles action filed during the
Reliance policy period.
In February 2003, G-I amended its complaint to claim
coverage under the Hartford policy.  In response to G-I’s new
claim, Hartford changed its position.  In March 2003, it obtained
permission from the District Court to withdraw its initial brief
and filed a new one invoking the interrelated wrongful acts
provision in the Hartford policy to deny coverage for the two
later actions.  It now argued—as it does here—that, due to that
provision, the two later actions relate back to the amended
Reliance policy period.  The District Court denied the motion to
dismiss but, as we have seen, eventually granted summary
judgment based in part on the interrelated wrongful acts
provision.
G-I argues that, because Hartford initially argued that the
CCR and Claimants Committee actions were not covered by the
Reliance policy, it should not be allowed to invoke the
interrelated wrongful acts provision to deny coverage for those
actions under the Hartford policy.  Under the doctrine of judicial
estoppel, a court can defend the integrity of the judicial process
by barring a party from taking contradictory positions during the
course of litigation.  See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S.
489, 504 (2006); Scarano v. Central R., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d
Cir. 1953); Ali v. Rutgers, 765 A.2d 714, 718 (N.J. 2000). 
       Other Courts, however, have gone the other way or are22
uncertain.  See, e.g., Monterey Development v. Lawyer’s Title
Insurance, 4 F.3d 605, 608–09 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying state
law); Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937–38 (D.C. Cir.
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As a threshold matter, we consider whether in diversity
cases we should apply federal or state judicial estoppel law.  In
general, federal courts apply state law in diversity cases, at least
where that law is substantive in nature.  See Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  But where an area of law
implicates a “strong federal policy,” federal law may apply.  See
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525,
538–39 (1958).  We have long avoided deciding whether federal
judicial estoppel law applies in diversity cases.  See In re
Chambers Development, 148 F.3d 214, 229 n.13 (3d Cir. 1998);
Ryan Operations v. Forrest Paint, 81 F.3d 355, 358–59  n.2 (3d
Cir. 1996).  But today we weigh in, as we believe that “[a]
federal court’s ability to protect itself from manipulation by
litigants should not vary according to the law of the state in
which the underlying dispute arose.”  Id. at 358 n.2.  In doing so,
we follow five other Courts of Appeals.  See Eastman v. Union
Pacific, 493 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007); Ogden Martin
Systems v. Whiting, 179 F.3d 523, 527 n.1 (7th Cir. 1999);
Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597,
603–04 (9th Cir. 1996); Guinness v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 900
n.20 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Allen v. Zurich Insurance, 667
F.2d 1162, 1167 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982)); Edwards v. Aetna, 690
F.2d 595, 598 n.4 (6th Cir. 1982).22
1980) (same); see also Alternative System Concepts v. Synopsys,
374 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that “[a]s judicial
estoppel appears neither clearly procedural nor clearly
substantive, there may be a legitimate question as to whether
federal or state law . . . should supply the rule of decision,” but
declining to answer it).
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Though there is no rigid test for judicial estoppel, three
factors inform a federal court’s decision whether to apply it:
there must be (1) “irreconcilably inconsistent positions;” (2)
“adopted . . . in bad faith;” and (3) “a showing that . . . estoppel
. . . address[es] the harm and . . . no lesser sanction [is]
sufficient.”  Chao v. Roy's Const., 517 F.3d 180, 186 n.5 (3d
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We do not
consider these factors, however, because, in our Circuit judicial
estoppel is generally not appropriate where the defending party
did not convince the District Court to accept its earlier position.
U.S. v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 223 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Montrose Medical v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 778 (3d Cir. 2001));
see New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001);
Dam Things From Denmark v. Russ Berrie, 290 F.3d 548, 559
n.16 (3d Cir. 2002).
Here the District Court never accepted Hartford’s prior
position.  Hartford withdrew that position and asserted its new
one (i.e., that the interrelated wrongful acts provision applies)
before the Court ruled on its motion to dismiss.  When it did
rule, the Court did not rely on Hartford’s initial position.
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Rather, it held against Hartford without discussing either
Hartford’s prior or new position.  On summary judgment,
Hartford reasserted its new position, and the District Court
relied on it.  Because the Court never relied on Hartford’s first
position, we shall not bar its new one.  
We do not mean to suggest that where no court has
accepted an initial position, judicial estoppel can never apply. 
We will apply it to neutralize threats to judicial integrity
however they may arise.  For example, in Krystal Cadillac-Olds
GMC Truck v. General Motors, 337 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2003), a
bankruptcy case, we applied judicial estoppel even though no
court had ever relied on the debtor’s initial position.  Id. at
320–21.  We did so because creditors almost certainly had relied
on it, undermining the bankruptcy process by weakening their
bargaining position.  Id. at 324–25.  
Here, G-I has provided no evidence of a threat to judicial
integrity other than Hartford’s inconsistent positions.  We
believe applying judicial estoppel here presents a greater threat
to judicial integrity.  We do not preclude arguments not accepted
by the District Court in part to ensure that the order in which a
party presents its claims does not determine the outcome of a
case.  Without this limitation, an amendment to a complaint can
checkmate opposing counsel by introducing a new claim the
defense of which contradicts the opposition’s initial position.
By amending its complaint, a plaintiff could (intentionally or
not) force the defense to choose between conceding the old
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claim or the new one.  That result is undesirable because a
defendant ought to have the opportunity to put up the best
possible defense in light of all the claims against it.  Where, as
here, a defendant has changed position in response to an
amended complaint, there is no offense to the integrity of the
judicial process warranting estoppel.  There is only danger to
that process averted.
IV.  CONCLUSION
Because it was concerned that Reliance would become
insolvent, G-I shifted part of the risk under an existing Reliance
policy to Hartford.  For a higher price, it might have shifted all
of it.  Because it did not pay that higher price and Reliance
became insolvent, G-I must seek coverage for risks it kept with
Reliance in that company’s liquidation proceeding.  Hartford,
both in its dealings with Reliance and in the policy it issued to
G-I, sought only to cover risks starting in July 2000 that were
not otherwise excluded (such as by the interrelated wrongful
acts provision).  It shielded itself from the claims for which G-I
now seeks coverage.  We decline to tamper with this scheme.
Although Hartford switched its position before the District
Court, that Court did not rely on the earlier position, and thus as
a threshold matter we will not bar the change.  We therefore
affirm in all aspects.
